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ABSTRACT 
Throughout the last century, severe financial crises hit the financial markets, whose effects then 
spread all over the world. Taking the recent example of the 2008 subprime crisis, it is now clear it had 
its main drivers in excess credit supply and record household debt, which had been spiking since the 
80’s and 90’s decades.  
Allied to weak risk management policies and the deregulation in financial markets, along with 
subprime credit concession and speculation regarding complex financial products, the households’ 
debt levels rose to a point that helped generate one of the greatest financial crises in history, whose 
effects were felt around the globe. 
From the moment these crises happened, various authors studied and analyzed the reasons behind 
the events leading to them, and how they reached the magnitude to cause such an impact. Several 
studies concerning households’ indebtedness and credit supply were made regarding many countries 
and provide a closer look at how these indicators are related and how they react in periods marked 
by financial crises as the ones described above. Some of them were able to prove that, indeed, there 
is a connection not only between them, but also with financial markets liberalization and weak risk 
management policies. 
After establishing a relationship between credit supply and household debt, and connecting both to 
business cycles, the core goal of this study is to evaluate the evolution of household debt in Portugal 
since the introduction of the Euro and which factors contributed with the most impact to that same 
evolution. 
Our work will start with a literature review to explain the credit-driven household demand channel 
concept and the dynamics implied and proceed with a statistical analysis of key indicators focusing 
on explaining the behavior of household debt in Portugal. These will include a time-adjusted 
correlations analysis and a linear regression model. Finally, we will present the conclusions reached 
through these methods, which resulted in a good performing model composed of five independent 
variables explaining the evolution of household debt to GDP in Portugal in different moments in 
time,  and present future study possibilities to enhance the knowledge on this topic. 
 
   
KEYWORDS 
Household Debt; Credit Supply; Financial Crises; Business Cycles; Financial Deregulation 
 
 
 
v 
 
INDEX 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1. Background and Problem Identification ............................................................ 1 
1.2. Research Gap & Objectives ............................................................................... 3 
2. Literature review ..................................................................................................... 5 
2.1. First Pillar: Credit Supply Expansions ................................................................. 5 
2.1.1. The “Global Savings Glut” ........................................................................... 7 
2.1.2. Rises in Income Inequality .......................................................................... 7 
2.1.3. Financial Liberalization and Deregulation ................................................... 9 
2.2. Second Pillar: Household Debt ........................................................................ 10 
2.3. Third Pillar: Business Cycles Dynamics ............................................................. 12 
3. Methodology and Results Analysis ......................................................................... 16 
3.1. Data Selection and Variables Definition........................................................... 16 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics ....................................................................................... 17 
3.3. Four-Step Progressive Analysis ........................................................................ 21 
3.4. Linear Regression Model and Results Analysis ................................................. 25 
4. Conclusions and Future Investigation ..................................................................... 31 
5. Bibliography ........................................................................................................... 33 
6. Annexes ................................................................................................................. 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 – Credit-driven household demand channel: Pillar 1 ..............................................5 
Figure 2.2 – Income Inequality and Household Leverage ........................................................8 
Figure 2.3 – Lending from Banks, Mortgage Institutions, and Finance Companies (percentage 
changes) .........................................................................................................................9 
Figure 2.4 – Credit-driven household demand channel: Pillar 2 ............................................10 
Figure 2.5 – Bank mortgage and non-mortgage lending to GDP, 1870–2011: Average ratio to 
GDP by year for 17 countries ........................................................................................11 
Figure 2.6 – Prediction Error in the Subprime-Prime Rate Spread .........................................12 
Figure 2.7 – Credit-driven household demand channel: Pillar 3 ............................................13 
Figure 2.8 – Household leverage ratios: Debt to disposable income .....................................13 
Figure 2.9 – Household leverage and the decline in consumption.........................................14 
Figure 3.1 – Household debt to GDP in Portugal ...................................................................18 
Figure 3.2 – Net exports to GDP............................................................................................19 
Figure 3.3 – Unemployment rate ..........................................................................................19 
Figure 3.4 – Government debt to GDP ..................................................................................20 
Figure 3.5 – Real investment ................................................................................................20 
Figure 3.6 – Real durable consumption .................................................................................20 
Figure 3.7 – Variance Inflator Factor .....................................................................................26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 – Variables.............................................................................................................16 
Table 3.2 – Descriptive Statistics ...........................................................................................18 
Table 3.3 – Non adjusted correlation matrix .........................................................................22 
Table 3.4 – One-year adjusted correlation matrix .................................................................23 
Table 3.5 – Two-year adjusted correlation matrix .................................................................24 
Table 3.6 – Three-year adjusted correlation matrix ..............................................................24 
Table 3.7 – Three-year adjusted linear regression.................................................................27 
Table 3.8 – Best correlations variables selection ...................................................................28 
Table 3.9 – Best correlations linear regression ......................................................................28 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
 
CDO  Collateralized Debt Obligations 
IMF  International Monetary Fund 
INE  Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
MBS  Mortgage-Backed Securities 
NAFTA  North American Free Trade Agreement 
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
Credit supply and household debt were the main drivers for some of the greatest financial crises that 
hit world economies throughout the last decades, whose effects then spread across the globe, and 
some of those effects still remain to today. 
As we take the 2008 subprime crisis as the most significant recent event in this context, Geithner 
(2015) suggested that record household debt was one of the five major causes of the crisis, which, 
through intricate dynamics, severely expanded the effects of a combination of factors which would 
cause the financial markets to collapse. 
In his work, Cottrell (2016) showed that the household credit market debt spiked in the 1980’s and 
1990’s, and that this increase was first related to the loss, by the middle class, of their previous levels 
of income, who recurred to household debt to maintain their lifestyle. Another crucial factor Cottrell 
(2016) pointed out was the deregulation of financial markets, as a consequence of the rise of the 
neoliberal policies carried out by the Reagan and Thatcher administration in the 80’s and the 
adoption of the NAFTA, under the Clinton administration, in the 90’s. With the deregulation of 
financial markets came credit supply expansion and speculation and, adding to the problem, more 
and more complex financial instruments emerged, such as mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations. The fact that a major part of the underlying securities composing 
these instruments corresponded to debt contracted in already precarious conditions from the 
debtors’ perspective and adding the fact that these products were backed by major rating agencies 
at the time, often granting them triple A ratings, were key factors leading to the bubble burst that 
would eventually come. 
Debt secured by residential real estate was the reason why debt substantially increased in the 
beginning of the twenty-first century until 2008, as proven by Brown et al. (2013). When these 
products collapsed, as a combined deferred consequence of subprime credit concession and lack of 
regulation, the crisis hit the markets. 
Irwin (2013) stated that central bankers were aware of the bubble in the housing market being a 
problem but weren’t able to predict the combination of factors that eventually aggravated it and 
caused the economy to collapse. 
Besides the 2008 subprime crisis, both credit supply and household debt played a key part in other 
global financial crises over the last decades, which affected several countries around the world, 
including Portugal. Indeed, the IMF (2017) and Drehmann et al. (2017) were able to relate sudden 
increases in the household debt-to-GDP ratio with turning points in business cycles. Mian & Sufi 
(2018) also reached the same conclusion. 
In this study, we will analyze the household debt levels in Portugal since the beginning of the twenty 
first century, more specifically the year when the Euro was introduced in the Portuguese economy, 
then identifying the main variables leading to that evolution. Before that, and based on what was 
mentioned so far in this work, we will establish a connection between credit supply and household 
debt, then relating this relationship with turning points in business cycles in our literature review. 
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These dynamics will be analyzed by applying the concept of the credit-driven household demand 
channel defined by Mian & Sufi (2018), which is a fundamental basis created by these authors to 
explain these connections and was later confirmed by the IMF, which then extended the study to a 
larger set of countries over the period 1950-2016. In their IMF published working paper, Alter, 
Xiaochen Feng, & Valckx (2018) reached the same conclusion for this larger countries sample that, in 
fact, household debt has a negative impact in GDP growth, thus establishing a reinforced connection 
between both variables. 
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1.2. RESEARCH GAP & OBJECTIVES 
Evaluating the intricate dynamics between credit supply, household debt and business cycles will 
allow the establishment of household debt as playing a crucial role in aggravating the effects of 
financial crises on an international scale. Hence, this study is important as it will apply these same 
concepts to Portugal and analyze which are the factors that produce the most impact in the 
evolution of household debt in the country. In doing so, it is potentially providing the future 
possibility of an early pattern identification that could lead to the same abovementioned 
consequences and allow pre-emptive measures to be taken beforehand.  
On a first approach, the goal is to determine if there is a specific evolution pattern regarding these 
cycles specifically concerning household debt, also applicable to Portugal, which could help better 
understand its effects in households, financial institutions and the financial markets and, posteriorly, 
potentially act in the sense of preventing or containing its effects on future periods where the same 
patterns are observed. 
The 2008 subprime crisis impacted several countries around the globe and irresponsible credit 
concession practices, in the form of subprime loans (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011), played a key 
role in the events previously described. This proves that credit supply and household debt are of 
paramount importance. 
Similar analyses have been made regarding other countries, which proved important in the sense 
that they allowed to corroborate the influence of household debt in relation to financial crises. 
Żochowski & Zajączkowski (2007) analyzed household debt growth in Poland, also comparing it to 
other European countries, and confirmed the connection between an increase in loans, financial 
market liberalization and financial crises. Jauch & Watzka (2012) studied household debt evolution 
and how it impacted the Spanish provinces in a macroeconomic perspective. Crook & Hochguertel 
(2007) showed that there are implications of credit concession constraints in the evolution of 
household debt through a systemic international comparison for four OECD countries (the United 
States of America, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands). Later, Loberto & Zollino (2016) from the Bank of 
Italy estimated an offset relation between declining bank rates on lending and shrinking credit 
volumes conceded by the Italian banks, used as a measure to reduce the banks’ credit exposure, 
which is an indicator that this could be a possible solution to control household debt while reducing 
the banks’ risk. 
This dissertation will extend that knowledge by applying it to Portugal. We will study the evolution of 
household debt over the last decades and relate it with factors such as private and governmental 
consumption levels, banks’ interest rate spreads and the aggravating impacts noticed on the curve of 
the cycle. This could prove important for financial institutions to evaluate if they are exposed to risk 
relating to a progressive increase in household debt, becoming a timely alert for them to take action. 
On the other hand, this could prove a useful indicator to measure the effectiveness of the risk 
policies and regulations implemented in Portugal over the past years, by concluding if household 
debt and banks’ credit concession actually decreased after they were put in place. This project will 
have as core goal to study and apply the concept of the credit-driven household demand channel, 
defined by Mian & Sufi (2018), to Portugal and evaluate the evolution of key indicators regarding the 
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country since the beginning of the century, thus including the period leading to one of the greatest 
financial crises that ever hit the world financial markets: the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis. 
The concrete objectives we aim to achieve by the end of our dissertation are as follows:  
- First, we will present the evolution of household debt in Portugal through a key economic 
indicator throughout the period in analysis and identify if there is an observable turning point 
related to the U.S. subprime crisis; 
- Second, we will verify which variables are the most relevant in explaining this evolution and if 
they do so in a linear way; 
- Third, we will evaluate how such variables evolution throughout the period is related to 
household debt in Portugal and if there are also observable patterns related to the U.S. 
subprime crisis and the measures applied in its sequence; 
- Finally, we aim to consider the results from our work to provide future study possibilities to 
improve the available knowledge in this topic. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
First of all, it is important to understand the concept of the credit-driven household demand channel 
in order to establish the relationship between the three main study points we will focus on in this 
literature review. 
The credit-driven household demand channel is sustained by three main pillars, which relate credit 
supply and household demand and, consequently, the amplified effects that these indicators’ 
evolution have on business cycles and financial crises. The subjacent idea is that the driver at the 
origin of amplified booms and busts in the economy is related to expansions in credit supply. These 
expansions, generated via different channels as we will describe later on, will represent an excess 
which will trigger an increment in household demand, which will respectively translate into an 
increase in household debt. Having more and easier access to credit, household demand expands 
and pushes house prices in an upward direction creating bubbles. Financial institutions, seeking to 
capitalize on the increase in the demand for credit, also tend to facilitate its access by the 
households, which translated in some cases into the reduction of credit quality constraints, 
aggravated by liberalization and deregulation in financial markets. All these factors combined have 
an amplifying effect on the business cycle and can actually aggravate financial crises, as was recently 
the case with the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. 
These are the facts on which the credit-driven household demand channel sets its ground. Now, we 
will divide this analysis into three main sections, each one directly related to one of the three pillars, 
and sustain with evidence the applicability of this concept, which will be the theoretical foundation 
used as a basis in this work. 
 
2.1. FIRST PILLAR: CREDIT SUPPLY EXPANSIONS 
 
Regarding the first section, which has credit supply at its center, Mian & Sufi (2018) stated in their 
work that “An expansion in credit supply, as opposed to technology shocks or permanent income 
shocks, is a key force generating expansion and contraction in economic activity” (Figure 2.1). 
The aforementioned authors concluded that a growth in credit supply is a main driving force of 
business cycles, and this fact has been corroborated by several other authors. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – Credit-driven household demand channel: Pillar 1 
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Krishnamurthy & Muir (2017) linked adverse real outcomes to substantial losses occurring after 
periods of expansion in credit supply, by studying the progress of credit spreads calculated 
essentially through two measures: the risk-neutral probability of a large loss and the risk-neutral 
expectation of output declines. 
They concluded that the gap between higher grade and lower grade bonds spreads presents a 
tendency to become smaller in periods of credit expansion occurring before a crisis. Although credit 
growth and spreads are positively correlated under regular circumstances, they are negatively 
correlated when calculated for the five years preceding a financial crisis. This translates into the fact 
that the risk-neutral probability of a large loss for a given investor actually decreases as credit growth 
expands, and they estimate that the spreads are 25% below their optimal value in pre-crises periods. 
They then conclude that the combination of credit supply expansion and uncommonly low spreads is 
an important factor to take into consideration when predicting crises, fact this that is sustained by 
the work of Mian, Sufi, & Verner (2017a) regarding the effect of a similar tendency in credit growth 
applied to an international sample dating a few decades back, until the 1970’s. 
On another perspective, Jordà et al. (2016) defined the sharp increase in credit supply under the 
form of real estate loans provided by banks as the main cause of the rise in credit-to-GDP ratios in 
advanced economies in the past century. More specifically, they demonstrated that the weight of 
mortgage loans in the lending portfolios of banks has doubled its value from around 30% at the start 
of the twentieth century to approximately 60% at the date of their study. Supported by this fact, they 
stated that the banks’ core business strategy has turned to investing in real estate related assets, by 
borrowing from the public and capital markets, which is a crucial explanatory factor of the 
substantial change in these institutions’ balance sheets composition. They linked record-high 
leverage ratios to the significant increase in household debt over the period in question, which is a 
potential cause for increment in the deterioration of households’ balance sheets stability and the 
financial sector in itself. 
Schularick & Taylor (2012) further explained the way leverage affects financial stability, highlighting 
that related to the banking sector. 
In their respective works, Aikman et al. (2016) and Admati & Hellwig (2013) also establish a 
connection between the rising leverage and dimension of the financial sector and excessive risk 
taking leading to financial crises. 
By analyzing data from advanced and emerging economies for the period 1973-2010, Gourinchas & 
Obstfeld (2012) established a sharp rise in leverage and the effects of a strong appreciation in the 
countries’ currencies as solid predictors of financial crises.  
Having established with evidences the connection between credit supply expansions and a more 
severe rise in household debt and posterior crises, it is now important to understand what factors 
drive these same expansions. We have distinguished three main causes behind these phenomena. 
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2.1.1. The “Global Savings Glut” 
 
As a first approach, Mian & Sufi (2018) defined that credit supply expansions are generated by a 
shock that creates an excess of savings relative to investment demand. This concept was presented 
by Bernanke (2005), who presented the "global savings glut" hypothesis while attempting to explain 
the severe current account deficit in the U.S. in 2005.  
In his example, Bernanke (2005) mentioned the sharp rises in the ratio of retiree to workers in 
several industrial economies as one possible shock that led to an excess level in global savings. The 
idea behind the glut is that this surplus savings will then be applied to supply credit, which was later 
corroborated by Alpert (2013) and Wolf (2014). Following Bernanke’s concept, Pettis (2017) refers to 
the oil price increases by the OPEC’s as an example of the glut, which generated excess US dollars 
that were therefore deposited in international banks. With these surpluses available to them, these 
banks became more active lenders and the shock leading to a savings glut caused an expansion in 
credit supply. Devlin (1989) had already pointed out the oil prices increase in 1973 and 1974 as a 
credit supply expansion source. 
 
2.1.2. Rises in Income Inequality 
 
The second factor impacting credit supply is a rise in income inequality. Kumhof et al. (2015) studied 
this hypothesis explaining that high-income households have a higher marginal propensity to save, 
since they prefer wealth accumulation, which will act as a driver for an increase in credit supply. They 
concluded that prior to both the Great Recession and the Great Depression, debt-to-income ratios 
regarding both low- and middle-income households suffered a sharp increase simultaneously, being 
that the savings from the high-income household segment acted as a credit supply expansion to the 
former, establishing the connection between a rise in income inequality and the above-mentioned 
shocks (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2 – Income Inequality and Household Leverage 
 
Krueger & Perri (2006) verified that, in the period preceding two major crises, the significant rise in 
income inequality levels was accompanied by a substantial increase in household debt. They were 
able to verify the link between increases in high-income households’ income share and high leverage 
levels concerning low- and middle-income households, which makes the economy more vulnerable 
to financial crises.  
To further support this factor as a potential driver of financial crises, Kumhof et al. (2015) studied an 
alternative case scenario, in which they reversed the effects of increasing income inequality over the 
ten years period after 1983 and concluded that leverage would sustainably decrease and 
substantially reduce the vulnerability to crises. 
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2.1.3. Financial Liberalization and Deregulation 
 
Finally, the third driver is related to financial liberalization and deregulation. According to Aliber & 
Kindleberger (2005), this phenomenon was a driving force which led to monetary expansion, foreign 
borrowing and investment speculation and affected several different countries, such as Japan, 
Mexico, Russia and the Scandinavian countries.  
Regarding the banking crises that hit Finland, Norway and Sweden in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, Englund (1999) stated that the then recent deregulation present in these credit markets 
originated a competitive environment between these institutions in which expansion was the main 
priority. Banks and mortgage institutions would then grow faster, and financial institutions which had 
expanded due to regulatory arbitrage would lose market shares more rapidly (Figure 2.3). 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – Lending from Banks, Mortgage Institutions, and Finance Companies (percentage changes) 
 
Still on this topic, Jonung et al. (2008) considered that financial deregulation was at the origin of the 
boom-bust cycle of the crises in Finland and Sweden, having been the catalyst allowing a significant 
capital influx as a means of financing domestic investments and consumption. 
Di Maggio et al. (2017) analyzed deregulation in the US through anti-predatory lending laws 
preemption and showed that the states where these laws were preempted suffered from an increase 
in mortgage credit supplied by national banks - institutions to which these laws did not apply - which 
would then trigger the same effect in house prices.  
Mian et al. (2017a) did the same analysis by states considering part of the 1980’s decade but using 
the removal of restrictions on inter and intrastate bank branching as a measure of deregulation 
instead. They proved that the states which removed these restrictions earlier were the ones that 
witnessed a higher rise in credit supplied by banks. Both studies soundly concluded that increases in 
10 
 
credit supply directly related to banking deregulation create a larger rise in debt in the short term 
and a stronger recession in the medium term. 
We have now established a solid connection between credit supply expansions and financial crises - 
through saving gluts, rises in income inequality and financial deregulation - taking this factor as a 
major driver of the boom-bust cycle.  
 
2.2.  SECOND PILLAR: HOUSEHOLD DEBT 
 
This leads us to the second pillar presented by Mian & Sufi (2018), which focuses on the effects that 
these credit supply expansions have on household debt and how the dynamics of both these 
variables intertwine. In their work, they stated that “The expansionary phase of the credit cycle 
affects the real economy primarily by boosting household demand as opposed to boosting 
productive capacity of firms in the economy” (Figure 2.4). 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – Credit-driven household demand channel: Pillar 2 
 
As stated by Jordà et al. (2016), both banks and households have sharply increased their leverage 
through mortgages over the second half of the past century. To support this fact, they analyzed 
household leverage ratios – weight of mortgage debt on the total value of the housing stock – and 
verified that they have grown significantly in several economies over the same period. They also 
concluded that non-mortgage lending’s part on explaining contemporary business cycles is now 
minor, as opposed to the increasingly substantial role played by the dynamics of mortgage credit 
(Figure 2.5). Leamer (2015) also noted the rising importance of housing finance for the economy as a 
whole.  
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Figure 2.5 – Bank mortgage and non-mortgage lending to GDP, 1870–2011: Average ratio to GDP by year for 17 
countries 
 
Still on this topic, Levitin & Wachter (2012) pointed out the rise of the private label securitization 
market as another factor to take into consideration, which is understood as involving mortgages that 
are not owned by the issuing bank nor a government sponsored enterprise. The rise of this market 
acted as a driver for an increase in subprime mortgages, which represented a credit supply expansion 
shock to borrowers who were previously denied access to credit due to their low credit worthiness 
(Mayer, 2011); (Mian & Sufi, 2009); (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). This evolution in the market 
would become intrinsically related to, and a main catalyst of, financial crises.  
Demyanyk & Van Hemert (2011) affirmed that the subprime mortgage market grew exponentially in 
the period 2001 to 2006, and the subprime mortgage loans became more and more risky because of 
the increasing demand from investors searching for higher yields through private label mortgage-
backed securities, which led to the quality of the market being significantly deteriorated. 
Piskorski et al. (2015) and Griffin & Maturana (2016) described the way fraud became a major issue 
in this market during the high phase of the mortgage credit boom, which according to Mian, Sufi, & 
Verner (2017b) and Griffin & Maturana (2016) helped explain the increase in house prices in some 
areas of the US.  
Keys et al. (2010) points out that the rise in the demand for these mortgage loans reduced the 
incentives of screening borrowers by the financial intermediaries, fact which helps explain the high 
default rates observed on these same loans.  
Demyanyk & Van Hemert (2011) concluded that for this rise to have been sustainable, an increase in 
the subprime mark-up should have followed the rapid increase in the loans’ overall riskiness, which 
actually declined over time. They showed that this subprime-prime spread observed a downward 
trend between 2001 and 2007 (Figure 2.6). In 2007, the subprime mortgage market crashed and one 
of the greatest financial crises in history emerged in the US. 
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Figure 2.6 – Prediction Error in the Subprime-Prime Rate Spread 
 
To wrap up these facts and their link to the credit supply expansion effects previously described, we 
take one of Jordà et al. (2016)’s conclusions from their study, in which they verified that there has 
been a long-term secular rise in private credit-to-GDP ratios, especially household credit-to-GDP 
ratios, accompanied by a rise in within country income inequality and across country savings gluts. 
According to Jordà, Schularick, & Taylor (2015), the rise of leveraged real estate booms is a main 
factor in the comprehension of financial crises. They identified a solid connection between monetary 
conditions, mortgage lending and house prices. The relation behind it is that, with the easing of 
monetary conditions, mortgage lending grows. Also, with house prices rising, the mortgages’ 
collateral gains value and so does a bank’s ability to lend further, given that its asset position is 
improved. In this sense, they verified that “loose monetary conditions are causal for mortgage and 
house price booms” and that “mortgage and house price booms are predictive of future financial 
crises”, due to the high risk caused by expanded leverage. Jordà et al. (2015) went even further, 
having analyzed that, after its substantial increase during the past century, real estate lending is now 
representative of the main share of bank lending in several countries. They did this study regarding 
Spain and Ireland and identified that the increase of real estate backed mortgages drove a significant 
expansion in private debt in these countries, being that their levels of mortgage debt to GDP 
approximately doubled from 1999 to 2008. 
 
2.3.  THIRD PILLAR: BUSINESS CYCLES DYNAMICS 
 
Later on, Mian & Sufi (2018) confirmed the boom-bust pattern associated with sudden increases in 
the household debt-to-GDP ratio. They use this relationship to explain and define the third pillar in 
their credit-driven household demand channel concept, which connects the household debt 
expansion, intrinsically related with increases in credit supply, to aggravated patterns in business 
cycles. In their work, they state “The contraction in the aftermath of a large increase in household 
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debt is driven initially by a decline in aggregate demand which is amplified by nominal rigidities, 
constraints on monetary policy, and banking sector disruptions” (Figure 2.7). 
 
 
Figure 2.7 – Credit-driven household demand channel: Pillar 3 
 
The evolution of the financial sector is not only intrinsically related to the recent global crisis, as it 
also helps explain business cycles across several countries over the last decades. Taking the Great 
Recession example, a striking tendency was empirically verified by many authors: a recession 
increases in severity as household leverage increases prior to it (Mian & Sufi, 2010), (Glick & Lansing, 
2010), (IMF, 2012), (Martin & Philippon, 2017). 
Glick & Lansing (2010) stated that the sharp growth in household leverage in the years preceding 
their work had amplifying effects in the bust cycle. They studied leverage by households in a sample 
of industrial countries and observed that it rose exponentially in the period leading to 2007, when 
the subprime crisis effects were felt in a more substantial manner in the economy (Figure 2.8). 
  
 
 
Figure 2.8 – Household leverage ratios: Debt to disposable income 
 
Rising savings and increasing default rates leading to the blossom of the negative effects caused by 
excess household leverage were common trends verified regarding these countries, similarly to the 
US, which had a negative impact on bank lending and consumption afterwards, thus affecting the 
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subsequent recovery.  Glick & Lansing (2010) verified that the household leverage ratio in the US 
increased by 42 percentage points in the period between 1997 and 2007. They then compared this 
value to the ones of different countries over the same decade, having shown that for countries such 
as Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark and Portugal the levels of household leverage were higher (85 
p.p., 82 p.p., 69 p.p. and 65 p.p. respectively), and that the opposite was true for countries such as 
Austria, Belgium and France (13 p.p., 14 p.p. and 15 p.p.). Afterwards, they showed that the 
countries which experienced the highest rises in household leverage over the period in question also 
observed the fastest increase in house prices over that decade, thus reinforcing the connection 
between increasing house prices and easy access to mortgage credit. Besides, they concluded that 
the countries which experienced the highest rises in household leverage prior to the crisis had a 
tendency to observe the most aggravated recessions.  
Glick & Lansing (2010) established that the fall in consumption was more severe in Ireland and 
Denmark, both having verified sharp rises in leverage before the crisis, and that consumption levels 
were actually flat or only slightly deteriorated in countries such as Austria, Belgium and France, all 
having verified small rises in leverage prior to the crisis (Figure 2.9). Still on housing prices, the 
authors affirmed that when substantial rises in borrowing occur and accompany asset prices bubbles, 
the costs can be quite high. They made this statement backed by the facts and events studied in their 
work, which established the link between deteriorating credit standards and above normal 
expansions in credit supply, which acted as a substantial driver for rising house prices. 
 
 
Figure 2.9 – Household leverage and the decline in consumption 
 
Mian & Sufi (2009) studied borrowing from households concerning the 450 largest US counties in 
population and proved that a sharp increase in household leverage in the preceding years to their 
study was a substantial catalyst for the recession that started in 2007. They affirmed, in a first 
approach, that the counties where subprime mortgages coexisted the most were the ones that 
observed fastest rise in house prices. On the one hand, having easy access to credit, the subprime 
buyers would continuously bid for houses leading to the rise in their prices, and, on the other hand, 
this would fuel lenders’ will to keep loosening credit standards and lending even more by assuming 
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house prices would keep rising indefinitely. Secondly, they concluded that for each additional dollar 
of value appreciation in house prices, the average owner would take out 25% to 30% via home equity 
borrowing to fund consumption or house improvement. This again represents the role of rising house 
prices pushed by easy mortgage credit as a primary catalyst of growth in the upward cycle. Finally, 
they stated that the counties which observed the sharpest rises in leverage also verified the highest 
increase in loan defaults and the most aggravated recessions.  
King (1994) observed a similar connection between recessions severity and preceding rises in 
household leverage regarding the early 1990’s recession. During his study, he noted that US 
consumer debt increased by more than 100% during the 1920’s decade, which would have an impact 
on the Great Depression severity in the early 1930’s. 
On another perspective, Martin & Philippon (2017) analyzed leverage in the Eurozone for the period 
englobing the Great Recession and defined a strategy to study whether something could have been 
done to prevent or reduce the aggravating effects of leverage in economic cycles. They stated the 
relation between private leverage and fiscal policies, proceeding to a macro-prudential policies 
counterfactual and a conservative fiscal counterfactual and one of the conclusions was that countries 
could actually have prevented the private leverage boom, and thus diminished the severity of the 
recession, by restraining private leverage and public debt. 
We have now established a solid connection between credit supply expansions, household debt and 
business cycles and crises, supported by the works of several authors throughout the past decades. 
This reinforces the applicability of the concept of the credit-driven household demand channel 
defined by Mian & Sufi (2018), which will be the theoretical foundation for this dissertation, applied 
to Portugal. Knowing this, we identified the most relevant variables used by some of these authors, 
which provided good results in their study. 
Mian & Sufi (2018) analyzed the change in the household debt-to-GDP ratio regarding the United 
States and also a sample of countries in the world between 2002 and 2007, and established a 
comparison to the change in the unemployment rate between 2007 and 2010, for both samples. 
López-Salido et al. (2017) used the capacity of changes in the spread between mid-grade corporate 
bonds and US Treasuries to predict credit spreads and, thus, better predict the evolution of the credit 
cycle. Mian et al. (2017b) studied the pattern connecting household debt increases and decreases in 
GDP growth. Jordà et al. (2015) analyzed credit supply variations through monetary policy shocks.  
We will use these and other variables already mentioned in this literature review, whose results were 
already described above, applying them to Portugal and also evaluate if there are other relevant 
variables taking into consideration the dissertation is specifically oriented to this country. 
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3. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
3.1. DATA SELECTION AND VARIABLES DEFINITION 
 
Our work started with a literature review of the most relevant studies made by several authors on 
this topic. We investigated how credit supply affects household debt and how this debt is related to 
financial crises. Regarding the subject, we analysed the work of Mian and Sufi in “Finance and 
Business Cycles: The Credit-Driven Household Demand Channel” (Mian & Sufi, 2018), which uses 
statistical methods to study the effects that certain economic and financial indicators have on the 
development of business cycles and establishes a connection between credit supply, household debt 
and financial crises. Taking this into consideration, we used this fundamental basis concerning 
household debt by applying it to Portugal in our study of the evolution of household debt and how it 
is affected by a series of other variables, having selected and adapted the most relevant variables 
used by these authors and applied them to reach our study objectives. Our focus will be the period 
between 2003 and 2018, which is comprised of sixteen years. We will use 2018 as the cut-off year 
since it is the most recent year for which there is complete data, and start sixteen years before that, 
in 2003, the first full year after the removal of the “escudo” from circulation and, thus, the full usage 
of the euro as the only official currency in circulation in Portugal. 
In order to do this, we researched and collected data from some of the main statistical information 
sources in Portugal and the world. The variables that we defined are as follows (Table 3.1): 
 
Variables 
Household debt to GDP 
Consumption to GDP 
Government debt to GDP 
Net exports to GDP 
Nominal exports 
Nominal imports 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 
Real consumption 
Real durable consumption 
Real effective exchange rate 
Real GDP 
Real government consumption 
Real house price index 
Real investment 
Real nondurable consumption 
Unemployment rate 
 
Table 3.1 – Variables 
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Most of the data that composes our variables was acquired from the databases of Banco de Portugal 
(the Portuguese Central Bank) and Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE). This includes information 
concerning GDP levels, consumption, imports and exports and investment, and also more specific 
data, such as mortgage and corporate spreads in relation to sovereign spreads. 
The majority of debt related data, namely household debt to GDP, non-financial firm debt to GDP 
and government debt to GDP was obtained from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).  
Information for more specific variables, such as the real effective exchange rate and the real house 
price index was gathered in the World Bank’s database and the forecast of growth from t to t+3 was 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund Fall World Economic Outlook. 
After gathering all the intended data, we filtered, segregated and allocated it in order to reach the 
values for our defined variables in the period of study. We then centralized all the variables and their 
corresponding data for the period between 2003 and 2018 in a table, in order to build the relevant 
statistics. 
We selected “Household debt to GDP”, which represents the total credit to households (core debt) as 
a percentage of GDP in Portugal, as the independent variable, since its behaviour is the core 
component we intend to study and explain in our work. The remaining variables were used to explain 
the abovementioned behaviour, through their relations with “Household debt to GDP”, and the most 
relevant ones were also be target of individual analysis. 
 
3.2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
After collecting all of the data, we built the descriptive statistics for each individual variable using the 
"Data Analysis" tool in Excel (Table 3.2): the variables which represent measures relative to the GDP, 
as well as “Unemployment rate” and “Real effective exchange rate”, should be read in percentage 
units; “Real house price index” should be interpreted as an index; the remaining variables are 
represented in Euros. From the calculated statistics, we focused in the "Mean" and "Standard 
deviation". Regarding "Household debt to GDP", we noted that it comprises a mean of 81% and 
standard deviation of 8%, which is related to the fact that this indicator had been increasing since 
2003 until 2009, one year after the subprime financial crisis hit the US markets, remaining with 
values of approximately 90% until 2012, the year when it progressively started to decrease as shown 
in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 – Household debt to GDP in Portugal 
 
Concerning the independent variables, we analysed standard deviations as a percentage of the mean 
(SDpM), to assess if there were variables which registered big fluctuations across the period in scope 
relative to their mean value. Knowing that the most relevant event that occurred in the period within 
our scope was the subprime crisis in 2008, and as stated above regarding “Household debt to GDP”, 
we expected to verify similar patterns of fluctuation in the years following this event. These statistics 
and calculations are presented in Table 3.2: 
 
  Mean Standard Deviation SDpM (%) 
Household debt to GDP 81 8  10% 
Net exports to GDP -6 4  -67% 
Unemployment rate 10 3  34% 
Government debt to GDP 88 29  33% 
Nominal exports 12,956,653,125 2,994,710,145  23% 
Real investment 9,250,612,675 1,671,859,678  18% 
Real durable consumption 2,643,966,788 438,558,354  17% 
Nominal imports 15,686,150,000 2,044,353,535  13% 
Real house price index 118 15  13% 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 117 13  11% 
Real nondurable consumption 19,899,596,168 912,896,179  5% 
Real government consumption 8,599,454,688 377,983,699  4% 
Real consumption 27,510,550,997 1,095,858,848  4% 
Real GDP 43,312,111,226 1,275,860,513  3% 
Real effective exchange rate 100 3  3% 
Consumption to GDP 64 1  1% 
 
Table 3.2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
First, we defined an SDpM cut-off for analysis of 15%. Also, we didn’t do further analysis on “Net 
exports” as it is related to another variable we will already analyse and also partially includes the 
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behaviour of “Nominal imports”: “Net exports to GDP”. We built graphs for the variables we 
selected, where we can verify that all “Net exports to GDP” (Figure 3.2), “Unemployment rate” 
(Figure 3.3), “Government debt to GDP” (Figure 3.4), “Real investment” (Figure 3.5) and “Real 
durable consumption” (Figure 3.6) present big fluctuations in the years following the subprime crisis. 
“Unemployment rate” in Portugal spiked from 7.8% in 2009 to 16.8% in 2013, having then decreased 
in a similar but reverse pattern until 2018, back to approximately 8% (Figure 3.3). The four remaining 
variables present their most significant variations from 2011 onwards: “Net exports to GDP” rises 
from -9% in 2011 to 0.55% in 2018 (Figure 3.2); “Government debt to GDP” almost doubled its value, 
from 77.6% in 2011 to 141.1% in 2018 (Figure 3.4); “Real investment” registered a decrease from 
approximately 41.8 billion Euros in 2011 to nearly 28.4 billion Euros in 2018 (Figure 3.5); and “Real 
durable consumption” decreased from roughly 12 billion Euros in 2011 to approximately 7.36 billion 
Euros in 2016, having then slightly recovered in the two following years, to nearly 8.7 billion Euros 
(Figure 3.6). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Net exports to GDP 
 
 
Figure 3.3 – Unemployment rate 
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Figure 3.4 – Government debt to GDP 
 
 
Figure 3.5 – Real investment 
 
 
Figure 3.6 – Real durable consumption 
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Taking this into consideration, we indeed verify that the greatest variations that these variables 
suffered coincide with the period following the subprime financial crisis which had its effects spread 
throughout the world, including Portugal. 
 
3.3. FOUR-STEP PROGRESSIVE ANALYSIS 
 
A key assumption in this investigation is that the effects of these variables’ evolution on “Household 
debt to GDP” may not be immediate and can thus take some time to have their impact noticed in our 
independent variable. Having this in consideration, we adjusted the values of all variables in relation 
to “Household debt to GDP” by one, two and three years, which will allow us to compare this last 
variable’s current values to the remaining ones’ values from, not only the same period, but also from 
either one, two or three years before. More specifically, we will compare the value of the 
independent variable in t to the remaining variables’ values in t, t-1, t-2 and t-3, thus being able to 
measure their correlations in each time frame and how they change when we do a comparison 
throughout the four periods.  
The purpose of this method is to check if the aforementioned gap is indeed reflected, verifying that 
these variables don’t make their impacts noticed immediately in “Household debt to GDP”. The 
adjustments will represent variations in the correlation between variables and help us comprehend 
which are the most important ones to explain household debt’s behaviour. While adjusting the 
values by one, two and three years, we did not come across missing values’ situations, which means 
all our data even after these adjustments corresponds integrally to the data that we gathered from 
the various sources mentioned above. 
After treating the data, we built four correlation matrixes, using the four sets of data adjusted by 
zero, one, two and three years, which we will designate as “Non adjusted correlation matrix”, “One-
year adjusted correlation matrix”, “Two-year adjusted correlation matrix” and “Three-year adjusted 
correlation matrix” respectively from this point onwards.  
At this stage, we expected not to verify significant correlations between the independent and the 
remaining variables in the “Non adjusted correlation matrix”, as we assumed that these effects 
would not be felt immediately. From there, we took the highest observed correlations and analysed 
their evolution in the “One-year adjusted correlation matrix”, “Two-year adjusted correlation matrix” 
and “Three-year adjusted correlation matrix” respectively, in which we expected to note increasing 
values in the referred correlations to the point they would become more and more significant and 
explanatory of the independent variable’s evolution across the period in observation. 
Having said that, we proceeded to a four-step progressive analysis of the correlations’ matrixes in 
order to be able to corroborate these expected behaviours or, on the contrary, note an evolution 
different from expected and understand its meaning. 
We defined [-1;0.6] and [0.6;1] as the cut-off interval for correlations considered significant and in 
which we would focus our attention. We started by examining the “Non adjusted correlation matrix” 
and immediately verified that, in relation to the independent variable “Household debt to GDP”, 
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there was only one correlation above 0.6: “Non-financial firm debt to GDP” presented a correlation 
of 0.69 (Table 3.3).  
 
  
Household 
debt to 
GDP 
Household debt to GDP 1.00 
Real GDP -0.09 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.69 
Government debt to GDP -0.19 
Real consumption -0.02 
Real durable consumption -0.46 
Real nondurable consumption 0.30 
Consumption to GDP 0.17 
Real investment -0.03 
Real government consumption 0.38 
Nominal exports -0.27 
Nominal imports -0.18 
Net exports to GDP -0.24 
Real effective exchange rate 0.30 
Unemployment rate 0.53 
Real house price index -0.49 
 
Table 3.3 – Non adjusted correlation matrix 
 
Regarding this observation, as it also concerns a debt to GDP measure but related to non-financial 
firm debt instead of household, we assumed that it would have a higher correlation with “Household 
debt to GDP” when comparing both variables at the same period, rather than adjusting the 
comparison by one, two and three years, so we expected this correlation to decrease in the next 
three steps. At this point, we can infer that from our 15 selected independent variables, only one has 
a significant correlation with “Household debt to GDP”, which is a sign that these effects could 
indeed come to be felt only after a certain period. Following this line of thought, we would now 
expect to observe more and increasing correlations in the next three steps of our analysis. 
In a second step, we analysed the “One-year adjusted correlation matrix” and focused first on the 
variable which stood out in the previous matrix (Table 3.4).  
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Household 
debt to 
GDP 
Household debt to GDP 1.00 
Real GDP 0.30 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.44 
Government debt to GDP -0.31 
Real consumption 0.36 
Real durable consumption -0.19 
Real nondurable consumption 0.62 
Consumption to GDP 0.38 
Real investment 0.18 
Real government consumption 0.67 
Nominal exports -0.24 
Nominal imports 0.02 
Net exports to GDP -0.40 
Real effective exchange rate 0.63 
Unemployment rate 0.23 
Real house price index -0.19 
 
Table 3.4 – One-year adjusted correlation matrix 
 
Looking at “Non-financial firm debt to GDP”’s correlation to the independent variable first, we 
noticed that it decreased to 0.44, having become less important in explaining its behaviour. Also, we 
now observed that three more variables stood out: “Real government consumption” presented an 
increased correlation of 0.67, having become more significant when compared to the non-adjusted 
matrix and being indeed the most significant variable at this point. Also, “Real effective exchange 
rate” and “Real nondurable consumption” increased in correlation to 0.63 and 0.62 respectively. 
Studying the matrix in a further deepened perspective, we could also verify big variations in 
correlations in two other variables: “Real GDP” and “Real consumption”. These two variables are the 
most promising ones to look at in the next step, as they might surpass our 0.6 threshold and solidify a 
pattern of an increasing link over time. 
These observations are not conclusive in themselves, but already signal a pattern that is building 
according to our premises, represented by variables with increasing correlations regarding 
“Household debt to GDP” as we analyse the connection their values had with the independent 
variable’s evolution one year later. To further support this investigation, we analysed the “Two-year 
adjusted correlation matrix” (Table 3.5).  
In this third step, we indeed verified the solidification of this pattern and the appearance of a few 
more variables with growing importance. 
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Household 
debt to 
GDP 
Household debt to GDP 1.00 
Real GDP 0.65 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.20 
Government debt to GDP -0.40 
Real consumption 0.65 
Real durable consumption 0.09 
Real nondurable consumption 0.75 
Consumption to GDP 0.47 
Real investment 0.32 
Real government consumption 0.85 
Nominal exports -0.23 
Nominal imports 0.15 
Net exports to GDP -0.47 
Real effective exchange rate 0.82 
Unemployment rate -0.02 
Real house price index 0.04 
 
Table 3.5 – Two-year adjusted correlation matrix 
“Real government consumption” established itself as the most correlated variable with “Household 
debt to GDP”, with a value of 0.85, followed by “Real effective exchange rate” and “Real nondurable 
consumption” which registered another increase, bringing their values up to 0.82 and 0.75 
respectively. As for the other two previously highlighted variables - “Real GDP” and “Real 
consumption” -, we noted another solid increase as both rose to 0.65. “Non-financial firm debt to 
GDP”, having decreased in the second step, continued this tendency (0.2). 
Finally, we used a fourth matrix, the “Three-year adjusted correlation matrix”, to definitively observe 
the tendency registered so far and create a solid basis for our period adjustment assumption (Table 
3.6). 
  
Household 
debt to 
GDP 
Household debt to GDP 1.00 
Real GDP 0.78 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.02 
Government debt to GDP -0.45 
Real consumption 0.75 
Real durable consumption 0.22 
Real nondurable consumption 0.71 
Consumption to GDP 0.49 
Real investment 0.40 
Real government consumption 0.90 
Nominal exports -0.26 
Nominal imports 0.12 
Net exports to GDP -0.48 
Real effective exchange rate 0.82 
Unemployment rate -0.20 
Real house price index 0.20 
 
Table 3.6 – Three-year adjusted correlation matrix 
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As expected, and confirming the evolution studied up until this point, we observed that all five of our 
highlighted variables which had been increasing in correlation with “Household debt to GDP” across 
our four-step progressive analysis maintain similar high correlations or slightly increase these values. 
These variables are “Real government consumption”, “Real effective exchange rate”, “Real GDP”, 
“Real consumption” and “Real nondurable consumption”, from which we highlight two, with 
correlations above 0.8 after adjustments: “Real government consumption” (0.9) and “Real effective 
exchange rate” (0.82). We expected that at least these two variables would be relevant in our linear 
regression model, which will be explained further ahead in this work, given that they don’t present a 
significant multicollinearity value. 
Gathering all the results from our four-step observations, we so far had reached three key 
inferences:  
- We were able to back up our assumption that indeed there are variables that gain 
importance and verify increases in their correlation to the independent variable as we adjust 
them by one, two and then three years to reflect the gap representative of the time they 
take to have their effects noticed in the evolution of “Household debt to GDP”;  
 
- There are also variables that decrease in terms of correlation and the ability to explain the 
behaviour of the independent variable;  
 
- We were able to restrict the variables that we deem as having a greater relation and, thus, a 
greater potential explanatory capability regarding the evolution of “Household debt to GDP”, 
namely “Real government consumption” and “Real effective exchange rate”. 
 
3.4. LINEAR REGRESSION MODEL AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
 
Having finalized the study of the main correlations between variables, we then built a statistical 
model in the form of a linear regression in which we attempted to corroborate the results of the 
four-step method and individual correlations analyses achieved above. 
First, we used the three-year adjusted variables, as it was in the fourth step of the correlation 
analysis that we verified the highest correlations between the dependant variable and the 
independent ones, being this the period adjustment we deemed more relevant in the analysis of 
“Household debt to GDP”. 
In order to do so, we built a multiple linear regression using the “Data Analysis” tool in Microsoft 
Excel, defining the data concerning “Household debt to GDP” from 2003 to 2018 as the independent 
variable data range, and the three-year adjusted data relative to the same period for all the other 
variables as the independent data range. We defined a 95% confidence level. 
The method we used was one where we built the regression with all variables in our scope, which we 
would then progressively remove in a stepwise analysis depending on key statistical indicators, such 
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as the Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) and the p-value regarding the individual variables, and the 
Adjusted R Squared and F-stat regarding the overall model. The Adjusted R Squared is an indicator 
which evaluates the strength of the relationship between the model and the dependent variable on a 
0 to 100% range, adjusted for the number of predictors in the model. The closer to 100% its value is, 
the better our model performs. Also, Akossou & Palm (2013) concluded in their study through a 
Monte Carlo simulation that, while the R Squared measure is biased in linear multiple regressions, 
the Adjusted R Squared is unbiased, or at least its bias is negligible. 
The p-value ranges from 0 to 1 and we used it to establish a significance threshold for each of the 
independent variables, through which we would reject the null hypothesis (Hassan, 2001). We 
considered variables with p-value lower than 0.05 as statistically significant to our model in rejecting 
the null hypothesis. 
Also, we proceeded to an analysis of these p-values combined with the F-stat, in which the value of 
zero represents the null hypothesis. The F-stat measures the joint significance of the variables under 
study, but not their significance individually (Blackwell, 2008). This combination allows us to assess 
the individual significance of each variable, without neglecting their joint significance. If low p-values 
and a high F-stat value are observed simultaneously, we verify that the model has a good explanatory 
capability regarding the dependent variable. 
Since our model consists of a multiple linear regression, we ultimately used the Adjusted R Squared 
and the ANOVA's F-stat, combined with the individual p-values, to evaluate its performance. 
In a first step, we built the linear regression with all the 15 variables in our scope as independent 
variables, using their three-year adjusted data, and “Household debt to GDP” as the dependent 
variable. 
Then, we analysed multicollinearity by calculating the Variance Inflator Factor for each of the 
independent variables, using the formula below (Figure 3.7): 
 
Figure 3.7 – Variance Inflator Factor  
(where S2xj= Squared Standard Deviation; n= Total observations; SE2bj= Squared Standard error; S2= Mean 
Square) 
 
Regarding the VIF, according to Mela & Kopalle (2002) in their analysis of multicollinearity in a 
multiple linear regression using this indicator, its value should be below 10 for us to consider the 
respective variable as not representative of high multicollinearity in the model.  
As such, we used this indicator as a key focal point when selecting the variables to remove from our 
regression in our stepwise analysis. Here, we highlight “Real consumption”, “Consumption to GDP”, 
“Nominal exports” and “Nominal exports to GDP” as the variables with the highest VIFs, and the ones 
we first removed. This process was repeated until we reached the final version of the three-year 
adjusted linear regression, which had variables “Real GDP”, “Real government consumption”, 
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“Nominal imports” and “Real effective exchange rate” as independent variables, all presenting a p-
value lower than 0.01 and VIF lower than 7.5. The Adjusted R Squared achieves a result of 0.919 and 
F-stat of 180.13 (Table 3.7): 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.961
R Square 0.924
Adjusted R Square 0.919
Standard Error 2.334
Observations 64
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 4 3923.31 980.83 180.13 2.4143E-32
Residual 59 321.27 5.45
Total 63 4244.58
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% VIF
Intercept -187.734 16.051 -11.696 p<0.01 -219.852 -155.617
Real GDP 2.3019E-09 4.41401E-10 5.215 p<0.01 1.41863E-09 3.19E-09 3.67
Real government consumption 9.7367E-09 1.92013E-09 5.071 p<0.01 5.89451E-09 1.36E-08 6.09
Nominal imports -1.2949E-09 1.64485E-10 -7.873 p<0.01 -1.62405E-09 -9.66E-10 1.33
Real effective exchange rate 1.055 0.197 5.357 p<0.01 0.661 1.449 3.16  
Table 3.7 – Three-year adjusted linear regression 
 
Three of these independent variables were deemed significant in our four-step progressive 
correlations analysis, and specifically present are the ones we had highlighted: “Real government 
consumption” and “Real effective exchange rate”. 
Upon reaching these results, we then decided to build another linear regression using, for the 
independent variables, the data adjusted by the period in which we verified the best correlation to 
“Household debt to GDP” in our four-step progressive analysis of the correlations’ matrixes, instead 
of the three-year adjusted data for all of them. This means, for instance, that we would now use the 
two-year adjusted data for “Nominal imports” instead of the three-year adjusted, as it had a higher 
correlation with the dependent variable over that period. This study was repeated for all 15 variables 
and the adjusted data was gathered in Table 3.8, which we used to build our definitive linear 
regression model. 
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Variable Adjustment period 
Real durable consumption 3 
Real effective exchange rate 3 
Real government consumption 3 
Nominal imports 2 
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 1 
Consumption to GDP 3 
Government debt to GDP 3 
Net exports to GDP 3 
Nominal exports 3 
Real consumption 3 
Real GDP 3 
Real house price index 3 
Real investment 3 
Real nondurable consumption 2 
Unemployment rate 1 
 
Table 3.8 – Best correlations variables selection 
 
The objective of this approach was to adjust the regression even further and verify its compatibility 
with the partial conclusions we had reached in the four-step progressive analysis of the correlations’ 
matrixes and the assumption under test, which regards the independent variables as having their 
impacts noticed the most on “Household debt to GDP” in different moments in time. 
By applying the same stepwise method previously explained, we reached the following linear 
regression model and respective results (variables applied period adjustment represented in 
brackets) (Table 3.9): 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.967
R Square 0.935
Adjusted R Square 0.929
Standard Error 2.183
Observations 64
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 5 3968.16 793.63 166.52 4.5053E-33
Residual 58 276.43 4.77
Total 63 4244.58
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% VIF
Intercept -170.078 13.028 -13.055 p<0.01 -196.156 -144
Real durable consumption 
(3)
4.9873E-09 9.78807E-10 5.095 p<0.01 3.02803E-09 6.95E-09 2.44
Real government consumption 
(3)
1.0164E-08 1.8032E-09 5.636 p<0.01 6.55413E-09 1.38E-08 6.14
Real effective exchange rate 
(3)
1.500 0.214 7.019 p<0.01 1.072033065 1.927522 4.24
Nominal imports 
(2)
-8.635E-10 1.82994E-10 -4.719 p<0.01 -1.22977E-09 -4.97E-10 1.85
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 
(1)
0.123 0.032 3.884 p<0.01 0.060 0.187 2.36  
Table 3.9 – Best correlations linear regression 
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As in the previous three-year adjusted linear regression model, variables “Real government 
consumption”, “Nominal imports” and “Real effective exchange rate” were selected as independent 
variables, but “Real GDP” was not deemed as one of the best variables to improve our model. 
Besides, two new variables were selected during the process: “Real durable consumption” and “Non-
financial firm debt to GDP”. This shows that, by considering the best correlations across a three-year 
period adjustment with “Household debt to GDP”, the variables selected in the stepwise method 
were different than the ones we got by considering simply the three-year adjusted variables across 
the scope.  
All the selected variables present a p-value lower than 0.01, which is indicative of high significance, 
and VIFs lower than the 7.5 threshold defined for our study. The regression returns an improved 
Adjusted R Squared of 0.929 relative to the previous model, while maintaining a highly significant 
value of 166.52, regarding the F-stat. It’s also worth noting that, analysing the coefficients, the 
variables whose variations translated into the highest coefficients relative to the dependent variable 
were “Real effective exchange rate” and “Non-financial firm debt to GDP”. The variations of the 
remaining three, i.e. “Real government consumption”, “Real durable consumption” and “Nominal 
imports” registered lower coefficients but are nevertheless highly significant explanatory variables 
according to the model’s results. The importance of the lower coefficients achieved for these three 
variables will be studied further below. 
The model’s results indicate that the fact that we considered the best correlations between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable “Household debt to GDP” improved the 
performance of the model, and further solidifies the assumption that the effects of variations in 
these variables are the most impactful in different moments in time. 
In sum, in our definitive linear regression model, the behaviour of “Household debt to GDP” is best 
explained by the values of “Real durable consumption”, “Real effective exchange rate” and “Real 
government consumption” from three years prior, “Nominal Imports” from two years prior and 
“Non-financial firm debt to GDP” from the previous year. 
Having selected the variables and analysing their significance through the metrics described above, 
we built the following equation using the regression’s coefficients and rounding the values to the 
third decimal place for presentation purposes: 
y = -170,078 + 1,5 X1 + 0,123 X2 + 1,02E-08 X3 + 4,987E-09 X4 - 8,645E-10 X5 
(where y= “Household debt to GDP”; X1= “Real effective exchange rate (3)”; X2= “Non-financial firm debt to GDP 
(1)”; X3= “Real government consumption (3)”; X4= “Real durable consumption (3)”; X5= “Nominal imports (2)”) 
We tested a practical example of variations in the independent variables, using real data from our 
database, in order to assess the impact that the lower coefficient variables would have in the 
dependent variable. We used real data from our database for each of the variables, selecting the last 
quarter of 2017’s “Household debt to GDP” and then selecting the data for the remaining variables 
using the same period as reference, adjusted by the number of years in question according to the 
criteria described in Table 3.9. We measured the impact that a 0.3 p.p. variation in “Nominal 
imports” would have in the dependent variable (the variation value was randomly chosen, for 
exemplification purposes; we expect similar conclusions from variations in the two other variables in 
question). We started by estimating y assuming the actual values in our database:  
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y 31/12/2017 = -170.078 + 1.5 (98.6) + 0.123 (111.7) + 1.02E-08 (8,291,318,000) + 4.987E-09 
(2,305,713,839) - 8,645E-10 (17,747,400,000) = 72.00 
 
 
Next, we applied as an example the 0.3 p.p. positive variation in “Nominal imports” to calculate the 
new y* value: 
 
 
y* 31/12/2017 = -170.078 + 1.5 (98.6) + 0.123 (111.7) + 1.02E-08 (8,291,318,000) + 4.987E-09 
(2,305,713,839) - 8,645E-10 (17,747,400,000*1.03) = 71.54 
 
Results show that, given that the values in question for X5 are highly superior to the ones concerning 
y, variations in its values will still have a significant impact in the dependent variable. Namely, a 
variation of 0.3 p.p. in “Nominal imports”, ceteris paribus, translates into a 0.46 p.p. in “Household 
debt to GDP”. 
Taking all these results and indicators into consideration, we reached a high performing model with 
five variables explanatory of the behaviour of “Household debt to GDP”, measuring the maximized 
impact that each one of them represents in different moments in time, over a three-year period 
adjustment. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE INVESTIGATION 
After its progressive increase until 2009, household debt to GDP in Portugal has been consistently 
decreasing since then until 2018, from 92% to 69% (Figure 3.1). This behaviour is similar to the ones 
of several other countries around the world (Alter, Xiaochen Feng, & Valckx, 2018), which has the 
subprime crisis originated in the U.S. as a main turning point. 
We concluded that, regarding the Portuguese case, this indicator is explained by the evolution of 
other variables, which have their impacts maximized on household debt to GDP in different moments 
in time. Real durable consumption, the real effective exchange rate and real government 
consumption from three years prior, nominal imports from two years prior and non-financial firm 
debt to GDP from the previous year are the indicators that better explain its behaviour in the current 
period of analysis.  
In fact, restrictions applied to credit concession and the reinforcement of international banking 
regulations via the Basel agreements and other regulatory frameworks applied following the 
abovementioned crisis were essential for controlling and reducing overall indebtedness across the 
economies and guaranteeing financial stability. The progressive reduction in real government 
consumption and non-financial firm debt to GDP after these events is then an understandable 
behaviour and explanatory of the subsequent decrease in household debt to GDP, as is the decrease 
in real durable consumption after such constraints were put in place (Annex 6.1) (Annex 6.2) (Figure 
1) (Figure 5). An overall more stable pattern verified in both banks and households balance sheets 
was essential in the evolution that these indicators presented over the past decade. Still on the topic, 
we verified that Portugal’s nominal imports observed a sharp decrease in 2010, and then resumed 
their growth in a decelerated manner. From 2010 to 2018, nominal imports verified a 0,5 billion 
euros reduction, which compared to the 22 billion euros increase in the previous eight years and the 
fact that nominal exports kept a consistent growth pattern signals that there was also a change in the 
Portuguese external commercial strategy which contributed to the change in the household debt to 
GDP paradigm (Annex 6.3) (Annex 6.4) (Figure 1). The real effective exchange rate, being analysed in 
this work after the implementation of the Euro in Portugal, consistently decreased after stopping its 
sharp growth and thus stabilizing in 2006, fact that further corroborates our analysis regarding a 
trade strategy which favours exports in detriment of growth in imports (Annex 6.5). 
These are the main factors which, in different moments in time, explain the behaviour of household 
debt to GDP in Portugal, which was rising until the subprime financial crisis hit the markets and then 
inverted this tendency after it and the implementation of a stricter regulatory framework, as 
happened in other countries. By considering the period in which the independent variables were best 
correlated with household debt to GDP across a three-year period adjustment, we reached a model 
with improved performance. This reinforces our initial assumption that by adjusting these indicators 
period of analysis we could reach the conclusion that their effects in the variable at study are not 
immediate nor linear among our scope. 
Having this in consideration, this work provides some interesting possibilities for future studies. First, 
an analysis of the main variables impacting household debt to GDP in other countries across Europe 
and the globe would be a promising basis for studying how different countries macroeconomic and 
financial strategies, political conditions and other factors contribute to observing different variables 
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affecting this indicator. A second promising study would be analysing if the fact that different 
variables affect Portuguese household debt to GDP in different moments in time is a pattern that is 
also observed in other countries, and if this same pattern has a different period adjustment 
structure. Finally, this study uses the fundamental basis verified by Mian and Sufi (2018) and 
solidified by Alter, Xiaochen Feng, & Valckx (2018) in their IMF published paper that there is a 
connection between credit supply, household debt and financial business cycles and focuses in 
explaining the factors that contribute to explaining the second. Applying the same analysis to credit 
supply would further improve the fundaments of this cycle and help identify patterns which 
contribute to explaining the behaviour of its first indicator. 
In a definitive perspective, applying predictive statistics techniques complemented by fundamental 
macroeconomic analysis to the credit-driven household demand channel could enable the 
anticipated identification of certain patterns that trigger this cycle and allow institutions and agents 
to take action in a more timely manner to prevent aggravated effects generated by financial crises 
such as the subprime mortgage crisis which had such a catastrophic impact in economies all around 
the world. 
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6. ANNEXES 
6.1. REAL GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
 
 
6.2. NON-FINANCIAL FIRM DEBT TO GDP 
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6.3. NOMINAL IMPORTS 
 
 
6.4. NOMINAL EXPORTS 
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6.5. REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE 
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6.6. NON-ADJUSTED CORRELATION MATRIX  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household 
debt to 
GDP
Real 
GDP
Non-
financial 
firm debt 
to GDP
Government 
debt to GDP
Real 
consumption
Real durable 
consumption
Real 
nondurable 
consumption
Consumption 
to GDP
Real 
investment
Real 
government 
consumption
Nominal 
exports
Nominal 
imports
Net exports 
to GDP
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Real 
house 
price 
index
Household debt to GDP 1.00
Real GDP -0.09 1.00
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.69 -0.49 1.00
Government debt to GDP -0.19 -0.16 0.40 1.00
Real consumption -0.02 0.97 -0.41 -0.12 1.00
Real durable consumption -0.46 0.80 -0.84 -0.31 0.78 1.00
Real nondurable consumption 0.30 0.89 -0.13 -0.13 0.94 0.54 1.00
Consumption to GDP 0.17 0.60 -0.10 0.02 0.77 0.50 0.78 1.00
Real investment -0.03 0.52 -0.65 -0.88 0.48 0.69 0.39 0.24 1.00
Real government consumption 0.38 0.54 -0.28 -0.72 0.59 0.48 0.64 0.52 0.79 1.00
Nominal exports -0.27 0.21 0.17 0.90 0.21 -0.01 0.15 0.13 -0.68 -0.58 1.00
Nominal imports -0.18 0.57 -0.01 0.66 0.58 0.31 0.52 0.40 -0.32 -0.23 0.90 1.00
Net exports to GDP -0.24 -0.29 0.40 0.95 -0.29 -0.43 -0.30 -0.21 -0.93 -0.83 0.85 0.53 1.00
Real effective exchange rate 0.30 0.18 -0.27 -0.91 0.13 0.21 0.18 -0.07 0.77 0.70 -0.78 -0.54 -0.85 1.00
Unemployment rate 0.53 -0.56 0.90 0.60 -0.50 -0.84 -0.27 -0.22 -0.83 -0.52 0.36 0.10 0.62 -0.50 1.00
Real house price index -0.49 0.40 -0.87 -0.69 0.33 0.70 0.13 0.03 0.83 0.49 -0.51 -0.30 -0.66 0.55 -0.93 1.00
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6.7. ONE-YEAR ADJUSTED CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household 
debt to 
GDP
Real 
GDP
Non-
financial 
firm debt 
to GDP
Government 
debt to GDP
Real 
consumption
Real durable 
consumption
Real 
nondurable 
consumption
Consumption 
to GDP
Real 
investment
Real 
government 
consumption
Nominal 
exports
Nominal 
imports
Net exports 
to GDP
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Real 
house 
price 
index
Household debt to GDP 1.00
Real GDP 0.30 1.00
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.44 -0.29 1.00
Government debt to GDP -0.31 -0.24 0.59 1.00
Real consumption 0.36 0.96 -0.16 -0.15 1.00
Real durable consumption -0.19 0.71 -0.80 -0.47 0.65 1.00
Real nondurable consumption 0.62 0.86 0.15 -0.05 0.93 0.35 1.00
Consumption to GDP 0.38 0.60 0.16 0.12 0.80 0.34 0.82 1.00
Real investment 0.18 0.50 -0.74 -0.91 0.40 0.75 0.22 0.07 1.00
Real government consumption 0.67 0.67 -0.16 -0.57 0.71 0.47 0.73 0.60 0.64 1.00
Nominal exports -0.24 0.06 0.49 0.92 0.12 -0.26 0.17 0.21 -0.78 -0.45 1.00
Nominal imports 0.02 0.47 0.36 0.68 0.53 0.06 0.55 0.50 -0.44 -0.06 0.88 1.00
Net exports to GDP -0.40 -0.40 0.55 0.94 -0.35 -0.58 -0.25 -0.13 -0.95 -0.72 0.86 0.52 1.00
Real effective exchange rate 0.63 0.37 -0.15 -0.69 0.32 0.21 0.38 0.13 0.58 0.71 -0.56 -0.29 -0.68 1.00
Unemployment rate 0.23 -0.40 0.91 0.76 -0.29 -0.82 -0.01 0.02 -0.88 -0.41 0.64 0.42 0.75 -0.38 1.00
Real house price index -0.19 0.24 -0.89 -0.83 0.12 0.69 -0.12 -0.19 0.88 0.36 -0.77 -0.61 -0.77 0.40 -0.93 1.00
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6.8. TWO-YEAR ADJUSTED CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household 
debt to 
GDP
Real 
GDP
Non-
financial 
firm debt 
to GDP
Government 
debt to GDP
Real 
consumption
Real durable 
consumption
Real 
nondurable 
consumption
Consumption 
to GDP
Real 
investment
Real 
government 
consumption
Nominal 
exports
Nominal 
imports
Net exports 
to GDP
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Real 
house 
price 
index
Household debt to GDP 1.00
Real GDP 0.65 1.00
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.20 -0.12 1.00
Government debt to GDP -0.40 -0.29 0.72 1.00
Real consumption 0.65 0.95 0.05 -0.13 1.00
Real durable consumption 0.09 0.57 -0.81 -0.64 0.47 1.00
Real nondurable consumption 0.75 0.84 0.37 0.07 0.93 0.12 1.00
Consumption to GDP 0.47 0.59 0.34 0.22 0.81 0.14 0.84 1.00
Real investment 0.32 0.45 -0.81 -0.93 0.29 0.83 0.02 -0.10 1.00
Real government consumption 0.85 0.77 0.03 -0.37 0.82 0.34 0.81 0.67 0.40 1.00
Nominal exports -0.23 -0.02 0.71 0.93 0.10 -0.51 0.28 0.32 -0.85 -0.23 1.00
Nominal imports 0.15 0.42 0.58 0.66 0.54 -0.17 0.64 0.60 -0.51 0.16 0.86 1.00
Net exports to GDP -0.47 -0.44 0.68 0.94 -0.33 -0.74 -0.11 -0.01 -0.97 -0.51 0.86 0.49 1.00
Real effective exchange rate 0.82 0.51 0.11 -0.37 0.51 0.07 0.58 0.36 0.26 0.76 -0.22 0.05 -0.36 1.00
Unemployment rate -0.02 -0.26 0.92 0.86 -0.11 -0.85 0.20 0.20 -0.92 -0.20 0.82 0.61 0.84 -0.11 1.00
Real house price index 0.04 0.13 -0.92 -0.89 -0.03 0.74 -0.31 -0.33 0.90 0.14 -0.91 -0.76 -0.83 0.10 -0.95 1.00
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6.9. THREE-YEAR ADJUSTED CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
Household 
debt to 
GDP
Real 
GDP
Non-
financial 
firm debt 
to GDP
Government 
debt to GDP
Real 
consumption
Real durable 
consumption
Real 
nondurable 
consumption
Consumption 
to GDP
Real 
investment
Real 
government 
consumption
Nominal 
exports
Nominal 
imports
Net exports 
to GDP
Real 
effective 
exchange 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Real 
house 
price 
index
Household debt to GDP 1.00
Real GDP 0.78 1.00
Non-financial firm debt to GDP 0.02 0.07 1.00
Government debt to GDP -0.45 -0.22 0.81 1.00
Real consumption 0.75 0.96 0.19 -0.09 1.00
Real durable consumption 0.22 0.32 -0.85 -0.77 0.25 1.00
Real nondurable consumption 0.71 0.85 0.51 0.19 0.93 -0.12 1.00
Consumption to GDP 0.49 0.60 0.40 0.21 0.81 0.02 0.82 1.00
Real investment 0.40 0.34 -0.85 -0.94 0.21 0.91 -0.12 -0.11 1.00
Real government consumption 0.90 0.82 0.26 -0.14 0.86 0.07 0.87 0.71 0.16 1.00
Nominal exports -0.26 0.06 0.82 0.92 0.16 -0.67 0.40 0.32 -0.85 0.02 1.00
Nominal imports 0.12 0.49 0.68 0.66 0.58 -0.34 0.71 0.61 -0.52 0.36 0.87 1.00
Net exports to GDP -0.48 -0.34 0.78 0.94 -0.26 -0.87 0.04 -0.02 -0.97 -0.24 0.86 0.49 1.00
Real effective exchange rate 0.82 0.61 0.37 -0.05 0.61 -0.20 0.72 0.46 -0.04 0.82 0.11 0.32 -0.02 1.00
Unemployment rate -0.20 -0.11 0.93 0.91 0.00 -0.88 0.34 0.24 -0.94 0.02 0.89 0.66 0.89 0.16 1.00
Real house price index 0.20 0.02 -0.93 -0.92 -0.12 0.80 -0.41 -0.36 0.91 -0.07 -0.94 -0.78 -0.86 -0.16 -0.96 1.00
